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Article 
Becoming Intelligible Woman: Gender, Disability and Resistance at the Border 
Zone of Youth 
Jen Slater, Sheffield Institute of Education, Sheffield Hallam University, UK 
Embla Ágústsdóttir, Tabú, Iceland 
Freyja Haraldsdóttir, Tabú, Iceland 
Abstract 
This paper considers young disabled women navigating ableist and heteronormative 
constructs of adult womanhood. We consider adult womanhood at the embodied 
intersection of gender, sexuality and dis/ability (categories themselves mediated by race, 
class, coloniality etc.). For young disabled women, questions of gender and sexuality were 
more often than not denied. Gendered and sexual identities were therefore politically and 
stƌategiĐallǇ used to Đlaiŵ ͚adult͛ aŶd ͚ǁoŵaŶ͛. Yet, suĐh identities often felt restricted to 
binary gendered frameworks. Already positioned through ableism as non-normative, to 
exist outside of heteronormativity felt dangerous, risking paternalism and non-consensual 
bodily intervention. Drawing on the cases of Ashley X and Marie Adams, we argue that 
these dangers are often more severe for those with labels of intellectual impairment and/or 
ĐoŶsideƌed to haǀe the ŵost ͚seǀeƌe͛ iŵpaiƌŵeŶts. Adulthood needs to be understood, not 
as a natural state of development (the endpoint of youth), but as a heteronormative and 
ableist socio-cultural-political construct, as well as a complex site of negotiation, conflict 
and resistance, which (differently) restricts how young people are able to become in the 
world. We fill a gap in scholarship by exploring the intersection of critical disability studies, 
crip theory, and youth studies from a feminist perspective. 
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Setting the Scene 
This paper is framed around a story set on a cold, blustery and wet, February Friday night in 
Reykjavik, Iceland. The story is of the three authors – all young women1 then in their early 
to mid-20s - heading downtown iŶto the Ŷightlife of IĐelaŶd͛s Đapital ĐitǇ. It ǁas the eŶd of 
Jen͛s fiƌst ǁeek iŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ, ǀisitiŶg as a researcher from the UK. Freyja and Embla, both 
of whom are disabled women and were then working at the Independent Living Centre in 
Reykjavik (NPA Miðstöðin, 2013), had offered to take Jen out for the evening2. Jen narrates 
the story: 
͞Embla had kindly agreed to pick me up, so I waved goodbye to my hosts, and dashed out 
to the car. As I was getting in, Embla told me that Freyja was running late. Freyja still had to 
do heƌ ŵakeup aŶd, ďeĐause ͞she takes ages to do her makeup͟, she͛d ĐatĐh up ǁith us 
later. I turned and looked at Embla. She was wearing a black dress, leather jacket, heeled 
boots, face made-up, and hair done. Then I caught a glimpse of myself in the rear-view 
mirror: make-up-less, hair a mess. I looked down at my straight-out-of-the-case outfit: the 
usual jeaŶs, ŵǇ ŵost ͚IĐelaŶdiĐ͛ ǁoollǇ juŵpeƌ, hiddeŶ uŶdeƌ ŵǇ teĐhŶiĐal ƌaiŶĐoat. Gloǀes, 
                                                          
1
 In the period between the fieldwork taking place, drafts of this paper, and final publication, Jen has 
questioned their relationship with 'woman' and now identifies as a trans genderqueer person. Jen now uses 
singular they/them pronouns. However, we have left woman in here to recognise Jen's past relationship with 
woman and the fluidity of gender more broadly. We have, however, used they/them pronouns in relation to 
Jen. 
2
 This story has also been told and differently analysed in Slater (2015) and Liddiard and Slater (2017). This 
paper, however, offers the fullest analysis. 
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hat and snow-ďoots fiŶish it off ŶiĐelǇ. ͞Muŵ ǁill ďe pleased at least; it͛s ǀeƌǇ seŶsiďle 
clothing for the Icelandic Winteƌ͟. I ǁoŶdeƌ hoǁ I͛ŵ goiŶg to feel ǁith the hipsteƌs of 
tƌeŶdǇ doǁŶtoǁŶ ‘eǇkjaǀik though, aŶd feel a ďit doǁŶ heaƌteŶed. ͞You look ŶiĐe,͟ I saǇ to 
Embla, ͞I͛ŵ goiŶg to feel a ƌight sĐƌuff ĐoŵiŶg out ǁith Ǉou tǁo͟. ͞DoŶ͛t ǁoƌƌǇ aďout it͟, 
Embla reassures me, ͞it͛s okaǇ foƌ Ǉou; Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot disaďled. I haǀe to get dƌessed up; I doŶ͛t 
ǁaŶt to liǀe the disaďilitǇ steƌeotǇpe!͟͟ ;“toƌǇ ƌeĐoƌded iŶ ƌeseaƌĐh diaƌǇ, ϰth FeďƌuaƌǇ 
2012). 
Our aim in this paper is not to tell the story of that night out (which continued enjoyably, 
but fairly unremarkably). Rather, we interrogate the final statement made by Embla, ͞it’s 
okay for you; you’re not disabled. I haǀe to get dressed up; I don’t ǁant to liǀe the disability 
stereotype!͟ We use this stateŵeŶt to frame a wider argument around the ableism and 
heteronormativity of adult womanhood.  As further outlined in the section which follows 
this introduction, this embodied moment prompts us to ask wider questions about 
adulthood, womanhood, youth and disability. Namely, we explore what prompts Embla to 
deĐlaƌe that she, as a disaďled ǇouŶg ǁoŵaŶ, ŵust get dƌessed up to Ŷot liǀe ͚the disaďilitǇ 
steƌeotǇpe͛. Lesko's (2012Ϳ ĐoŶĐeptualisatioŶ of ͚Ǉouth as ďoƌdeƌ zoŶe͛, Butleƌ͛s ;1999) 
ideas of ͚iŶtelligiďle suďjeĐts͛, aloŶgside aŶ eǆploƌatioŶ of aďleisŵ ;Campbell, 2009; Mingus, 
2011), theoretically underpin our work. After outlining how we came to write this paper, 
two consecutive sections contextualise research surrounding adulthood: first, we introduce 
how some within Disability Studies have challenged the disablism within disabled young 
people͛s liǀes; second, we introduce of Lesko͛s  uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of ͚Ǉouth as a ďoƌdeƌ zoŶe͛. 
We aƌgue that Lesko͛s ǁoƌk can productively extend current disability studies perspectives 
of youth and adulthood. Noting, however, that Lesko omits to discuss disability, theories of 
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ableism, alongside queer and crip theory, build our theoretical perspective in a section 
called, Ableist Heteronormativity.  
Through our analysis we highlight the dangerous ableist heteronormativity of adulthood 
and womanhood driven by binary gendered, ableist, racialised and classed constructs of 
independence, financial self-sufficiency, property ownership and normative family relations, 
including parenthood. Using our own conversations alongside case studies of Ashley X and 
Marie Adams (Roets, et al., 2006) we explore how the possibilities for resisting normative 
adulthood constructs differ depending upon intersectional identities and social positioning. 
In particular, we focus on the implications of adulthood for young disabled women, 
including those with labels of intellectual impairment who are often particularly excluded 
from gendered and sexualised discourse. Our overarching argument is that adulthood is not 
an innate way of being, neither is it wholly age-based. Rather, adulthood is an ableist 
concept, which intersects with identity, embodiment and social positioning, to constrain the 
ways that all young people can (or cannot) 'become-in-the-world-with-others' (Price and 
Shildrick, 2002, p.62Ϳ. The papeƌ adds to this speĐial issue ďǇ deŶatuƌalisiŶg ͚adulthood͛, 
shiŶiŶg a light oŶ ǁho is left out of ͚adult͛, aŶd loĐates adulthood ;oƌ the iŵpossiďilitǇ of 
adulthood) at the embodied intersection of gender, sexuality and dis/ability3 (categories in 
themselves mediated by race, class, coloniality and so on). More broadly, the paper fills a 
gap in scholarship exploring the intersection of disability studies, crip theory, and studies of 
youth from a feminist perspective. 
                                                          
3
 When we use dis/ability (with a forward slash) we are acknowledging the co-constituted relationship 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚aďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚disaďilitǇ͛ - troubling the binary, yet hierarchical, relationship between the two (the 
pƌioƌitisatioŶ of ͚aďilitǇ͛Ϳ, aŶd highlightiŶg that both are terms constructed by an unequal societies which, 
through ableism and disablism, prioritise certain ways of being and doing (the terms ableism and disablism are 
further explored in the section called Ableist Heteronormativity) (Goodley, 2014). When we use the term 
disability (without a forward slash) we are following the social model definition of disability, referring to a 
marginalised and politicised group of people who are disabled by society.  
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How we came to write this paper 
The paper uses a mixture of illustrative case study examples, theoretical explorations and 
conversations between the three authors to argue the dangers of ableist and 
heteronormative adulthood.  We include this section of the paper, on how we came to be 
writing this together, following Handsforth and Taylor (2016), who highlight the value in 
attempting to make the embodied process of feminist co-writing (at least partially) explicit. 
We also include this section of the paper as we agree with Richardson (1998) that we have 
learnt through the process of writing together, and hope that through the inclusion of this 
section the reader will more readily understand our relationships, positionalities and 
methodological perspectives. 
Conversations between the three authors began as part of an auto/ethnographic (Spry, 
2001) study with young disabled people across the UK and Iceland in 2011 and 2012.  The 
aiŵ of the ƌeseaƌĐh ǁas to iŶteƌƌogate the ŵeaŶiŶgs assoĐiated ǁith ͞Ǉouth͟, ͞adult͟, 
͞disaďled͟ aŶd ͞aďle͟ ;Slater, 2015).  Jen was the researcher, spending three months 
(between February and April 2012) with Embla, Freyja and other young disabled people in 
Iceland. Freyja and Embla were participants in Jen͛s ƌeseaƌĐh, aŶd at the tiŵe theǇ ǁeƌe 
ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ IĐelaŶd͛s fiƌst aŶd oŶlǇ IŶdependent Living Cooperative, which they had together 
founded in 2010 (NPA Miðstöðin, 2013).  Although the research began as an ethnography, 
Jen followed Spry (2001) in employing the term auto/ethnography to highlight that 
although the aim of research was not to tell Jen͛s stoƌǇ, Jen's story was significant and 
tangled amongst the stories of others (see also Slater, 2015).To name Freyja and Embla only 
as participants in Jen͛s ƌeseaƌĐh, however, is to downplay their significance in the research 
process, and to not fully explain the relationships between the three authors. At the time of 
fieldwork, Freyja was 25, Embla 21, and Jen Ϯϯ. We speŶt lots of tiŵe ͚haŶgiŶg out͛, 
 6 
 
meeting almost daily. Jen was welcomed into Embla and Freyja͛s saumaklúbbur4,  
introduced to their Icelandic friends and comrades and through these connections spent 
time with disabled children, young people and their parents, as well as with others working 
or with an interest in Disability Studies.  
When in Iceland, Freyja and Embla became Jen͛s soĐial, as ǁell as ƌeseaƌĐh ĐiƌĐle. As Jen put 
it in their ƌeseaƌĐh diaƌǇ, ͞ǁith eǀeƌǇ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ I ǁas thiŶkiŶg agaiŶ aďout ŵǇ ͚data͛, and 
ŵǇ ƌelatioŶships ǁith Ǉouth, adulthood aŶd disaďilitǇ͟ ;Slater, 2013, p.134). Since Jen left 
Iceland the three authors have remained colleagues and friends - staying in touch online via 
email and social media, meeting-up for social occasions and at various Disability Studies 
events. Although in many ways productive, friendship through and alongside research 
brought with it particular ethical dilemmas (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Tillmann-Healy, 2003). 
EthiĐal appƌoǀal ǁas gaiŶed thƌough MaŶĐhesteƌ MetƌopolitaŶ UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s ethiĐs 
Đoŵŵittee, ďut ethiĐs ǁeŶt ŵuĐh deepeƌ thaŶ just ͞pƌoĐeduƌal ethiĐs͟ ;GuilleŵiŶ & Gillaŵ, 
2004, 263). Jen drew on principles from participatory Disability Studies research (Chappell, 
2000; Priestley & Stone, 1996; Zarb, 1992), feminist methodology (e.g. Macpherson & Fine, 
1995) and other projects where friends were participants, or friends had been made 
through the research process (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Tillmann-Healy, 2003). Relying heavily 
on their research diary for both data gathering and analysis (see Richardson, 1998), Jen 
recorded stories as they saw and heard them. Yet, Jen tried to ensure representations were 
considered fair by their participants by validating ideas with young disabled people 
throughout the continuous and iterative process of analysis (Zarb, 1992). This was not to 
seek any truth or objectivity, but in order to treat stories, and participants, with the respect 
                                                          
4
 TƌaŶslatiŶg to ͚seǁiŶg Đluď͛, saumaklúbbur is a time where Icelandic women traditionally 
get together to sew, though nowadays sewing rarely takes place; rather women eat, drink 
and chat together. 
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they deserved. With Embla and Freyja this included writing a conference paper, Crip-
Queering Adulthood: Three Stories of Growing Up (Ágústsdóttir, Haraldsdóttir and Slater, 
2013).. Crip-Queering Adulthood was presented at The Child, Youth, Family and Disability 
Conference held at Manchester Metropolitan University in 2012. This paper is a 
development of Crip-Queering Adulthood and some reflections from within Crip-Queering 
Adulthood aƌe used as ͚data͛. Moƌe details of the research which originally took place, 
including further theorisations, can be found in Slater (2015). We turn now to introduce our 
theoretical perspectives. 
Contextualising Adulthood: Critiques from Disability Studies 
The vignette in the introduction tells the story of three young women going downtown on a 
Friday night in Reykjavik. It describes a moment where Jen, as a non-disabled, queer, white, 
non-binary young woman, feels awkward for not dressing in a conventionally feminine way 
in comparison to her disabled friends, Embla and Freyja. Embla͛s ƌespoŶse is foƌ Jen not 
ǁoƌƌǇ aďout it, ͞Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot disaďled. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to liǀe the disaďilitǇ steƌeotǇpe͟. IŶ this 
section we begin our interrogations of this moment, by usiŶg ͚Ǉouth͛ to shiŶe a ĐƌitiĐal light 
oŶ ͚adulthood͛. 
Human development is often understood through biologically essentialist viewpoints as a 
relatively predictable series of stages: from child, through youth, we reach adulthood, 
before old-age and death. Whereas adulthood is presented as a time of relative stability 
(Wyn & White, 1997), youth is often considered a life-stage ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ͚tuƌďuleŶĐe͛, 
͚tƌouďle͛ ;Finn, 2001Ϳ, ͚stoƌŵ aŶd stƌess͛ ;G. S. Hall, 1904).  This discourse of youth as 
unstable is perpetuated through particular disciplinary perspectives, such as psychology, 
neurology and medicine (Ortega & Choudhury, 2011), self-help guides that (shakily) rest 
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upon these disciplines (e.g. Bradley, 2003; for critique see Elman, 2014; Slater, 2016), as 
well as policy, practice (Finn, 2001) and popular discourse (Elman, 2014; Slater, 2016). As 
the instability of youth must be overcome to reach the security of adulthood, through 
youth, questions of adulthood futures emerge, often based around future paid work, 
heterosexual relationships and parenting (Slater, 2015)). Yet, the questions that are asked 
(or indeed, not asked) vary dependent upon identity, embodiment and social positioning. As 
Freyja explains, reflecting on her experiences as a disabled young woman: 
͞At faŵilǇ gatheƌiŶgs I felt the worst. My cousins who were similar ages to me were asked 
by relatives about their future plans: whether they had a boyfriend, if they were going 
oǀeƌseas, aŶd ǁhat theǇ ǁeƌe plaŶŶiŶg oŶ doiŶg afteƌ Đollege. I ǁasŶ͛t asked a thiŶg. EǀeŶ 
nowadays when my cousins are cross-questioned about their relationship statuses or when 
theǇ aƌe goiŶg to haǀe ĐhildƌeŶ, I get the eŵďaƌƌassiŶg gaze: ͞I ǁill Ŷot ŵake heƌ 
uncomfortable by asking her about her love life or future plans of children, she obviously 
doesŶ͛t haǀe a ďoǇfƌieŶd … aŶd kids?! Well…͟ The oŶe tiŵe a distaŶt ƌelatiǀe did ask me if I 
was seeing someone and what plans I had after graduation I was so astonished I almost fell 
out of ŵǇ Đhaiƌ…ďut it felt good, ďeiŶg Đƌoss-ƋuestioŶed, just this oŶĐe.͟ (Ágústsdóttir, 
Haraldsdóttir and Slater, 2013) 
Reflecting Freyja's experiences, Disability Studies researchers (Beresford, 2004; Hughes, 
Russell, & Paterson, 2005; Morris, 2002) have highlighted that disabled young people are 
rarely expected to fulfil normative adulthood expectations by, for example, having 
(heterosexual) relationships, going overseas or to college, or having children (see also 
Appleby, 1992). Disabled young people are therefore often denied the questions commonly 
asked to their non-disabled peers. In reaction, some authors have argued that disabled 
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young people are 'just the same as everybody else'. Morris (2002, p.7), for example, writes 
that ͞seǆ aŶd seǆuality figure as important issues in the transition to adulthood for non-
disabled young people but adults do not always recognise that disabled young people will 
haǀe the saŵe seǆual feeliŶgs of otheƌs of theiƌ age͟. 
It is peƌhaps thaŶks to aŶ aƌguŵeŶt that disaďled people aƌe ͚just like eǀeƌǇďodǇ else͛ that 
there has been a degree of liberal acceptance of some disabled people into the various 
markers of adulthood (sexuality, independence, financial self-sufficiency) (Slater, 2015). Yet, 
poŶdeƌiŶg oǀeƌ theiƌ disaďled soŶ ǁho ͞oǀeƌ the Ǉeaƌs has ĐolleĐted a ǀaƌietǇ of laďels͟, 
Ferguson and Ferguson (2001, p.ϳϭͿ ǁoƌƌǇ that a disĐouƌse of disaďled people as ͚just like 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ else͛ ĐoŶtiŶues to eǆĐlude those disaďled people positioned furthest from the 
markers of adulthood, particularly those with labels of intellectual impairment. 
Furthermore, Sothern (2007, p.ϭϱϭͿ highlights that a disĐouƌse of disaďled people aƌe ͚just 
the saŵe as eǀeƌǇďodǇ else͛ ƌelies oŶ ͞ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg the binary construction of gender 
thƌough ǁhiĐh disaďled ďodies ;aŶd otheƌsͿ ďeĐoŵe Otheƌed͟. “otheƌŶ uses the eǆaŵple of 
;heteƌoͿseǆualitǇ, aƌguiŶg that although soŵe disaďled people͛s seǆualitǇ ŵaǇ haǀe ďeeŶ 
aĐkŶoǁledged, a ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ ͚saŵeŶess͛ ofteŶ functions within a heterosexual framework 
(Abbott, 2013; Iino, 2011; Sothern, 2007). The problems of this were clear for Embla, as a 
disabled lesbian: 
͞…just foƌ the ƌeĐoƌd, ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ƌe gaǇ, Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷeǀeƌ asked if Ǉou͛ll haǀe kids. With disaďilitǇ 
Đoŵes deseǆualisatioŶ… so Ŷot ďeiŶg stƌaight Ŷeǀeƌ Đoŵes iŶto the eƋuatioŶ. Disaďled 
lesďiaŶs… is theƌe suĐh a thiŶg?͟ ;Ágústsdóttir, Haraldsdóttir, and Slater 2013) 
The final question Embla asks: ͞disaďled lesďiaŶs… is theƌe suĐh a thiŶg?͟ ƌefeƌs to ƌeseaƌĐh 
done by Skjaldardóttir (2012), a friend of Embla and Freyja. When doing research into 
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soĐietǇ͛s attitudes toǁaƌds disaďled lesďiaŶs foƌ heƌ BA thesis, “kjaldaƌdóttiƌ ǁas Ŷot 
surprised to find that there was little support for disabled lesbians in Iceland. She was, 
however, shocked at the response of many of her friends when she told them the subject of 
heƌ ƌeseaƌĐh: ͞disaďled lesďiaŶs… is theƌe suĐh a thiŶg?͟  It seeŵed the deseǆualisatioŶ of 
disabled women meant that the possibility of disabled lesbians was unimaginable.  
Contextualising Adulthood: Youth as a Border Zone 
Although not focusing specifically on disability, Lesko (2012) takes a different approach to 
eǆaŵiŶiŶg Ǉouth aŶd adulthood. ‘atheƌ thaŶ ďegiŶŶiŶg ǁith ǇouŶg people͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐes, 
she instead interrogates and historically contextualises youth as a social construct. For 
Lesko, questions of adulthood futures are not separate or peripheral to our understandings 
of youth, but integral to them. Youth, Lesko (2002Ϳ aƌgues, is Ŷot a ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ stage of Đhild-
adult deǀelopŵeŶt, ďut a poliĐed ͚ďoƌdeƌ zoŶe͛ ďetǁeeŶ Đhild aŶd adult ǁhiĐh is pƌoduĐed 
as a social fact. Disciplining technologies such as schools, families and youth services work 
differently to shape the incomplete, irrational, unproductive, desexualised child, into the 
complete, rational, productive, and (hetero)sexual, adult, particular to a time and place. 
Youth as border zone is unlike traditional developmental approaches which equate 
'developmental difference' as innate and often deficient (particularly where disabled people 
are concerned), yet neither is it equitable with more liberal approaches which emerge from 
some disability research and activism, which argue through a discourse of 'sameness'. 
Rather, youth as border zone allows us to see such difference as relational: entwined 
betwixt and between infinite possible forms of embodiment and the socio-cultural-political 
context within which that embodiment functions and is understood.  
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To contextualise her argument, Lesko (2012) highlights that the concept of adolescence was 
first acknowledged at a time of American colonisation at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Although pƌojeĐted as ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ aŶd ͚Ŷeutƌal͛, theƌefoƌe, the adult ĐitizeŶ desiƌed ďǇ 
psychologists studying adolescence was both raced (white), and gendered (with the 
majority of study concentrating on boys). Technologies of adolescence rationalised ďoǇs͛ 
education which aimed ͞to pƌoduĐe ǇouŶg, ŵasĐuliŶe, ChƌistiaŶs͟ ;Lesko, ϮϬϬϮ, p.183) who 
would work for the good of the nation. Policies and practices worked in particular racialised 
and gendered ways. There was a general consensus, for example, that educators needed to 
Đƌeate ͞ŵoƌe ŵaŶlǇ ďoǇs aŶd ŵoƌe ǁoŵaŶlǇ giƌls͟ ;Lesko, ϮϬϭϮ, ϲϲͿ. OŶe ǁaǇ of doiŶg this 
was to encourage boys to take part in team sports. However, as team work was considered 
to ďe ͞a foƌŵ of assoĐiatioŶ rooted in the heritage of the Anglo-“aǆoŶ ͞ƌaĐe͟͟ ;Lesko, ϮϬϭϮ, 
p.ϲϳͿ, it ǁas thought that teaŵ spoƌt ǁould ͞Đoŵe ŶatuƌallǇ to AŶglo-Saxon youth but 
Đould uplift otheƌs if theǇ ǁeƌe eduĐated to it͟ ;Lesko, ϮϬϭϮ, p.66). In other words, team 
play was considered as a way to make non-Anglo-“aǆoŶ ďoǇs ͚ŵoƌe ŵaŶlǇ͛, aŶd ǁith this 
ǁeƌe ĐoŶŶotatioŶs of ďeiŶg ͚ŵoƌe ǁhite͛. Giƌls oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, ǁeƌe eŶĐouƌaged to take 
paƌt iŶ ŵoƌe ͚appƌopƌiatelǇ feŵiŶiŶe͛ aĐtiǀities, suĐh as ĐheeƌleadiŶg. This geŶdeƌed foĐus 
reified the binary between young men and women, and worked to further establish a 
heteronormative order. 
Notwithstanding Lesko's (2012) productive analysis, disability is not addressed in her work. 
The absence of a disability analysis is particularly conspicuous as ͚aďilitǇ͛ is iŵpliĐated ǁithiŶ 
the racialised and heteronormative discourses of adulthood to which young people are 
eǆpeĐted to aspiƌe. Lesko highlights, foƌ eǆaŵple, the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe put oŶ ͚Ǉouth͛ duƌiŶg its 
eŵeƌgeŶĐe as a tiŵe to Đƌeate a ͚healthǇ͛ generation of young adults to make up a 
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physically productive workforce who would be able to fight for their country. To be able and 
adult was also to be white and male (Lesko, 2002). The paper now turns, therefore, to 
further Lesko's work by centring ableism in our exploration of adulthood.  
Ableist Heteronormativity 
According to Campbell (2009, p. 4Ϳ aďleisŵ is a ͞Ŷetǁoƌk of ďeliefs, pƌoĐesses aŶd pƌaĐtiĐes 
that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as 
the perfect, species-tǇpiĐal aŶd theƌefoƌe esseŶtial aŶd fullǇ huŵaŶ͟. Disaďlisŵ, oŶ the 
other hand, is the resultant practices which lead to the oppression of disabled people. Much 
Disability Studies research around disabled young people rightly highlights the disablist 
practices in the lives of young disabled people (Goodley, 2014). Many young disabled 
people, for example, don't have the opportunity for a night downtown, whether that is due 
to a lack of finances (more disabled people than non-disabled live in poverty, and living with 
impairment is often expensive - Tinson, Aldridge, Born, & Hughes, 2016), necessary support 
(as highlighted by the Stay Up Late campaign: http://stayuplate.org/), inaccessible venues 
or discriminatory practices (e.g. Bullen, 2016). Rather than consider specific disablist 
practices taking place within youth or adulthood, however, in this paper we are considering 
the ableist heteronormativity of adulthood constructs and how this restricts the possibilities 
of becoming for young disabled women at the border zone of youth. We argue that the 
ableism of adulthood means that disaďled people aƌe ƌaƌelǇ uŶdeƌstood as ͚adult͛ aŶd thus 
disablist practice is normalised. We see the ableism of adulthood, for example, when we 
take into account Lesko's (2002) analysis of the desired 'healthy' generation of adults at the 
turn of the Twentieth Century. We can also point to present day examples, such as the 
ableist requirement to be a flexible neoliberal worker in adulthood (the expectation that a 
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͚good͛ ǁoƌkeƌ should ďe aďle to spoŶtaŶeouslǇ ǁoƌk loŶg, uŶpƌediĐtaďle houƌs aŶd tƌaǀel 
seamlessly). 
Considering adulthood through a lens of ableism, however, also highlights how adulthood 
functions in relation to other forms of social positioning (gender, class, race, sexuality and 
so on). Campbell (2012, p. 12Ϳ poiŶts out that the Đoƌpoƌeal ;adultͿ staŶdaƌd isŶ͛t oŶlǇ 
ƌeliaŶt oŶ the ĐategoƌǇ of dis/aďilitǇ, ƌatheƌ ͞[t]he ŶuaŶĐes of aďleisŵ […] aƌe 
transcategorical, having specific cultural alignments with other factors such as race, gender, 
sexuality and colonialitǇ͟ ;see also MiŶgus, ϮϬϭϭͿ. Although to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚adult͛ is to ďe 
ĐoŶsideƌed ͚aďle͛ – ͚aďle͛ to ďe fiŶaŶĐiallǇ self-suffiĐieŶt, ͚aďle͛ to ďe iŶdepeŶdeŶt, ͚aďle͛ to 
fulfil the projected needs of a particular society at a given time (currently, global capitalism) 
- the paƌtiĐulaƌ eǆpeĐtatioŶs of ͚aďilitǇ͛ aƌe also geŶdeƌed, ƌaĐialised aŶd so oŶ. Butleƌ 
(1999, p.ǆǆiiͿ, foƌ eǆaŵple, asks us to ĐoŶsideƌ ͞hoǁ pƌesuŵptioŶs aďout Ŷoƌŵatiǀe geŶdeƌ 
and sexuality determine in advance what will qualify as 'human' and the 'livable'?͟ For 
Butleƌ ƌatheƌ thaŶ soŵethiŶg ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ seǆ aŶd geŶdeƌ aƌe aĐts ŵateƌialised thƌough 
performativity. Gender is presented to us a binary male/female construct and heterosexual 
hegemony is (re)constituted through a reiterative performance of these roles. For a life to 
ďe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚liǀeaďle͛ oŶe ŵust ďe ĐoŶsideƌed aŶ iŶtelligiďle suďjeĐt ďǇ ͞ďeĐoŵiŶg 
geŶdeƌed iŶ ĐoŶfoƌŵitǇ ǁith ƌeĐogŶizaďle staŶdaƌds of geŶdeƌ iŶtelligiďilitǇ͟ ;Butleƌ, ϭ999, 
p.22). Normative adulthood therefore relies upon 'correct' performances of gender. 
MĐ‘ueƌ ;ϮϬϬϲa; ϮϬϬϲďͿ fuƌtheƌs Butleƌ͛s ǁoƌk. He aƌgues that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of the ͚aďle 
ďodǇ͛ aƌe eŶtǁiŶed ǁith ĐoŶstƌuĐts of Ŷoƌŵatiǀe geŶdeƌs aŶd seǆualities. Just as Butleƌ 
claims the heterosexual ideal to be performative, McRuer argues that the ideal able-bodied 
identity can never fully be achieved. He also highlights that disabled people are rarely 
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considered to be normatively gendered or sexual (see also Gill, 2015). Rather, they are 
often understood as queer: never fully able to achieve heterosexuality, and always 
understood (paradoxically) as either asexual or hypersexual (see also, Liddiard, 2014). In 
some ways this seems to juxtapose Embla͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐes as a disaďled lesďiaŶ. Yet, here 
McRuer uses queer in the sense of transgression and resistance from the norm, rather than 
in relation to a specific identity. Furthermore, he highlights that queer people have also 
been implicated in narratives of disability through, for example, medicalisation and 
seaƌĐhes foƌ a ͚Đuƌe͛ to ŶoŶ-normative genders and sexualities (McRuer, 2006a, p.94). 
Un/Intelligible Womanhood  
To centre ableism in a discussion of adulthood is to think holistically and intersectionally 
(Crenshaw, 1989Ϳ aďout ǁho is/isŶ't uŶdeƌstood as ͚aďle͛/'adult', aŶd hoǁ adulthood 
constructs and prioritises certain ways of being in the world (white, male, non-disabled, 
heterosexual, cisgender, living in Western Europe or North America). For young disabled 
women, dangerous relationships between disability, youth, gender and sexuality function to 
posit their bodies as desexualised (Garland-Thomson, 2002), childlike (Johnson, Walmsley, 
& Wolfe, 2010), and therefore the property of others, to be subject to intervention (Barton, 
1993; McCarthy, 1998). We had many conversations around the entwined workings of 
ableism and gender performativity whilst Jen was in Iceland. Wrapped up in these were 
alǁaǇs peƌfoƌŵaŶĐes of ͚adult͛ aŶd ͚aďle͛. As ǁe saǁ iŶ the opening vignette, Embla and 
Freyja felt that Jen's ͚aďle-ďodied͛ pƌiǀilege alloǁed Jen to resist an expected performance 
of heterofemininity in a way that they, as disabled young women, could not. Indeed, there 
was no initial expectation of heterofemininity there for young disabled women to resist. 
Therefore, whilst Jen could make a decision to not put on make-up and get dressed up on a 
night out, Embla and Freyja took the political decision to assert themselves as gendered and 
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seǆual ďeiŶgs thƌough a peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of feŵŵe. TakiŶg the ͚Ŷot ďotheƌiŶg͛ optioŶ ǁould ;as 
Embla puts itͿ ŵeaŶ ͚liǀiŶg the steƌeotǇpe of the Đute little disaďled giƌl͛; the deseǆualised 
disabled person, positioned in a perpetually childlike state (Garland-Thomson, 2002). Yet, 
although the decision was indeed a conscious politicisation to assert disability in the realms 
of womanhood (something which we return to in the penultimate section), it required 
constant self-surveillance.  
Embla and Freyja͛s situatioŶ illustƌates “otheƌŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ǁoƌƌǇ aƌouŶd a ŶoƌŵalisatioŶ 
appƌoaĐh to disaďled people͛s geŶdeƌs aŶd seǆualities. “otheƌŶ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p.147) argues that in 
(neo)liberal societies, rather than see an explicit segregation and overt intolerability of 
diffeƌeŶĐe, ǁe see iŶstead see a ͞liďeƌal iŶtoleƌaďilitǇ of diffeƌeŶĐe͟, ǁhiĐh ŵaŶifests itself 
iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs. IŶ oƌdeƌ to ďe ƌeŶdeƌed ͚kŶoǁaďle͛, ďoth Ƌueeƌ seǆualities aŶd the 
disaďled ďodǇ haǀe to ďe ƌeŶdeƌed ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛. OŶĐe ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ theǇ aƌe aĐĐepted ǁithiŶ a 
ĐeƌtaiŶ ͚kŶoǁaďle͛, ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌks ǁhiĐh ͞puts pƌessuƌe oŶ disaďled ďodies to ďe 
seǆualised iŶ hegeŵoŶiĐallǇ kŶoǁaďle ǁaǇs͟ ;“otheƌŶ, ϮϬϬϳ, p.152). To be intelligible as 
adult, disaďled ǇouŶg people ŵust ͚pass͛ as iŶtelligible by buying into the strict gender 
binaries of the heterosexual matrix (Butler, 1999Ϳ.  Although ͚passiŶg͛ ǁithiŶ this fƌaŵeǁoƌk 
has its own problems, the danger for those unable to pass is that they remain outside this 
knowable subjectivity, remaining Other, and therefore subhuman. This is particularly 
peƌtiŶeŶt foƌ those that ŵaǇ Ŷeǀeƌ ďe ĐoŶsideƌed as ͚the saŵe as eǀeƌǇďodǇ else͛ ;FeƌgusoŶ 
and Ferguson, 2001; Kittay, 1999; Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016) or within normative 
constructs of gender and sexuality (Gill, 2015), such as some people with labels of 
intellectual impairment. 
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Intellectual Impairment and Intersectionality 
We turn now to use case studies of two young women with intellectual impairments, Ashley 
X and Marie Adams, to illustrate how ableist, heteronormative discourses of adulthood can 
lead to non-consensual bodily intervention for disabled young women.  The stories of these 
young women starkly illustrate the dangers of not being considered adult woman that 
provoked Embla͛s stateŵeŶt ;͞it͛s okaǇ foƌ Ǉou; Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot disaďled. I haǀe to get dƌessed 
up; I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to liǀe the disaďilitǇ steƌeotǇpe!͟Ϳ. As we cannot separate disability, gender 
and sexuality from classed and raced understandings of adulthood, in the final part of this 
section we explicitly address how class and race also mediate understandings of normative 
womanhood and adulthood. 
Ashley X was nine-years-old when, in 2007, news broke that she had three years earlier 
been subject to medical interǀeŶtioŶ to stop heƌ gƌoǁth aŶd ͚deǀelopŵeŶt͛. TƌeatŵeŶt 
included hysterectomy, the removal of breast buds, to prohibit growth of her breasts, and 
high doses of oestrogen to stop growth (Edwards, 2008). Much of the justification around 
AshleǇ͛s tƌeatŵeŶt depeŶded oŶ heƌ pƌesuŵed iŶaďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate aŶd to ƌatioŶalise 
decisions about her own future (Kafer, 2013). As Ashley was not understood as (becoming) 
rational and reasonable, neither was she understood as becoming adult (Kittay & Carlson, 
2010; Slater, 2015Ϳ. AshleǇ͛s doĐtoƌs defeŶded theiƌ aĐtioŶs ďǇ situatiŶg AshleǇ͛s life iŶ 
contrast to adulthood constructs associated with produĐtiǀitǇ ;i.e. that she ǁouldŶ͛t ǁoƌk 
or have a romantic relationship) (Kafer, 2013). Yet there were also specificities relating to 
AshleǇ͛s seǆed ;feŵaleͿ aŶd geŶdeƌed ;giƌlͿ status. AshleǇ͛s paƌeŶts aŶd ŵediĐal 
professionals decided on her behalf that eŶsuƌiŶg AshleǇ͛s ďodǇ Ŷeǀeƌ aĐƋuiƌed ďƌeasts oƌ 
menstruated would prevent her future discomfort, and make it easier for her parents to 
take care of her (Hall, 2011). The treatment and subsequent discussion explicitly marked 
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AshleǇ͛s ƌepƌoduĐtiǀe Đapaďilities as markers of womanhood, and therefore, to Ashley 
(never to be considered as a woman) as redundant. 
As headliŶes ďƌoke, AshleǇ͛s paƌeŶts ǁeƌe ĐƌitiĐised. It ǁas posed that theiƌ aĐtioŶs ǁeƌe 
͞gƌotesƋue͟ ;Đited iŶ Hall, ϮϬϭϭ, p.5), to which they replied: ͞the pƌospeĐt of haǀiŶg a full-
gƌoǁŶ feƌtile ǁoŵaŶ eŶdoǁed ǁith the ŵiŶd of a ďaďǇ is ǁhat is ƌeallǇ gƌotesƋue͟ ;Đited iŶ 
Hall, 2011, p.ϱͿ. AshleǇ͛s steƌilisatioŶ ǁas deeŵed a ǁaǇ of pƌeǀeŶt the ͞eŵďodied 
asǇŶĐhƌoŶǇ͟ ;Kafeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p.48) of a mind and body considered to be developing at 
different speeds from each other. The adult female body was framed as fundamentally 
aďout ƌepƌoduĐtioŶ aŶd as AshleǇ͛s life ǁas Ŷot iŶtelligiďle as adult ǁoŵaŶ, the tƌeatŵeŶt 
ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed ďǇ ŵediĐs as justifiaďle. AshleǇ͛s corporeality disrupted understandings of 
child and adult, and therefore interventions were made for her body to remain in a state 
that could easily be understood as childlike. 
For Kafer (2013, p.ϱϲͿ, theƌefoƌe, AshleǇ͛s tƌeatŵeŶt ǁas positioŶed ͞as a Đuƌe for adult 
ǁoŵaŶhood as ŵuĐh as adult disaďilitǇ͟. Kafeƌ also highlights hoǁ the AshleǇ X Đase 
fuŶĐtioŶed aƌouŶd a daŶgeƌous aŶd slippeƌǇ disĐouƌse of seǀeƌitǇ of iŵpaiƌŵeŶt. AshleǇ͛s 
treatment was based on the premise that she was innately different to her peers and Kafer 
(2013, 67) highlights that even others within disability scholarship and activism have 
positioŶed AshleǇ as ͞too seǀeƌelǇ disaďled to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed a disaďled peƌsoŶ͟. 
Without denying the problematic nature of justifying bodily intervention dependent upon 
͚seǀeƌitǇ of iŵpaiƌŵeŶt͛, it ǁould ǁƌoŶg to pƌesuŵe that steƌilisatioŶ ǁas oŶlǇ eǀeƌ 
eŶfoƌĐed oŶ those ǁith the ŵost ͚seǀeƌe iŵpaiƌŵeŶts͛. Parents of children with 
iŵpaiƌŵeŶts ĐoŶsideƌed less ͚seǀeƌe͛ ĐoŶtaĐted AshleǇ͛s paƌeŶts afteƌ the treatment 
became public to share their enthusiasm that it be possible for their child (Kafer, 2013). In 
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another example, Roets, Adams and Hove (2006) tell a story of one of the authors, Marie 
Adams, who has the label of intellectual impairment. They document the battles that Marie 
aŶd heƌ allies faĐed ǁheŶ steƌilisatioŶ ǁas, iŶ ϮϬϬϮ, ͞iŵposed oŶ Maƌie as aŶ aďsolute, 
iŶeluĐtaďle ŶeĐessitǇ͟ ;ϭϲϳͿ. IŶ this stoƌǇ ǁe see disaďilitǇ liŶked ǁith ŶoŶ-normative 
sexuality and a childlike state of ďeiŶg. DeĐlaƌed ͚seǆuallǇ uŶfit͛, Maƌie is also deeŵed 
incapable of making other decisions that we may associate with adulthood, such as 
controlling her own finances. The article explains that there was no attempt to engage 
Marie in informed discussions of sex and sexuality. Rather, attempts are made to scare her 
iŶto agƌeeiŶg to steƌilisatioŶ as she is giǀeŶ the adǀiĐe that ͞ďǇ goiŶg ahead ǁith the 
steƌilizatioŶ she ǁas Ŷeǀeƌ goiŶg to haǀe tƌouďle ǁith ͚shadǇ ďlokes ǁho ǁaŶt to ƌape Ǉou͛ 
any moƌe͟ ;‘oets, et al., ϮϬϬϲ, p.170). 
With support from her self-advocacy group, mother and academic advocates, Marie 
resisted sterilisation. However, the sterilisation of disabled young women with labels of 
intellectual impairment is not a historical phenomenoŶ ;‘oets, et al., ϮϬϬϲͿ. Maƌie͛s fight 
took place in Belgium in 2002. Furthermore, although the occurrence of surgical sterilisation 
may have decreased, young women with labels of intellectual impairment are often given 
long-term contraception, without explanation, their knowledge or consent (Chamberlain, 
Rauh, Passer, McGrath, & Burket, 1984; McCarthy, 1998; Tilley, Walmsley, Earle, & 
Atkinson, 2012). The justification often used is that sterilisation/long-term contraception 
prevents abuse (McCarthy, 1998) - an argument that Kafer (2013) points out is hinted at 
within the Ashley X case. Such arguments, however, not only remove blame from violent 
perpetrators and place responsibility upon women, but increase the likelihood of abuse, as 
much abuse is perpetrated by male family and staff members, who presumably realise their 
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persecution is reduced as detection through pregnancy will not occur (McCarthy, 1998, 
571).  
Our argument so far is that the ableism and heteronormativity of adulthood restricts how 
young disabled women can live their gendered and sexual lives. For young disabled women, 
particularly those with labels of intellectual impairment, being understood outside of 
normative constructs of womanhood can be dangerous. Furthermore, as the label of 
intellectual impairment is in itself socially constructed within societies which value certain 
ways of being over others, the benchmarks foƌ ǁho is/isŶ͛t ĐoŶsideƌed ͚iŶtelleĐtuallǇ 
iŵpaiƌed͛ aŶd theƌefoƌe ͚adult͛ aƌe slippeƌǇ. WƌitiŶg iŶ a U“ ĐoŶteǆt, Eƌeǀelles ;ϭ99ϲͿ, foƌ 
example, highlights that young people of colour are more likely to be given a label of 
͚deǀelopŵeŶtal delaǇ͛ thaŶ their white peers. Speaking in the UK, McWade (2016) 
highlights that people who are economically and socially disadvantaged are most likely to 
be detained under the Mental Health Act, and therefore deemed irrational and outside 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs of ͚adult͛. IŶdeed, it is within the last 25 years at the time of writing that the 
World Health Association removed (male) homosexuality as a mental health problem from 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), and gender dysphoria (a label that 
transgender people often need to acquire to access healthcare), continues to be considered 
to ďe Đlassified as a ͚disoƌdeƌ͛ ;foƌ ĐƌitiĐal disĐussioŶs see Tosh, ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
Questioning the essentialism of such labels is important as it further separates markers of 
adulthood (and indeed womanhood) from innate ways of being, and instead positions them 
as a product of unequal societies. Furthermore, it highlights the relevance of classed and 
racialised perspectives to those of gender, sex, sexuality and disability. In her analysis of 
AshleǇ X Kafeƌ ƌeŵiŶds us that AshleǇ͛s ǁhiteŶess aŶd ŵiddle Đlass status ŵeaŶ that she is 
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a child who can spark public discourse, as she is deemed worthy of concern and ͚care͛ (even 
if the ƌesults of this ͚Đaƌe͛ aƌe duďiousͿ. “iŵilaƌlǇ, Embla, Freyja and Jen are all white and 
none of us is poor. Ndopu (2013), ǁho desĐƌiďes hiŵself as ͞a BlaĐk Queeƌ Cƌip of the 
African diaspoƌa͟, eǆplaiŶs that ǁheŶ ǁeaƌiŶg tƌeŶdǇ, fashioŶaďle Đlothes he is ƌead 
diffeƌeŶtlǇ thaŶ ǁheŶ ǁeaƌiŶg Đasual Đlothes. As he puts it, ͞Đasual attiƌe […] ƌeŶdeƌ[s] ŵǇ 
ďodǇ the peƌsoŶifiĐatioŶ of disheǀelŵeŶt aŶd ŶegleĐt͟, Ŷot oŶlǇ due to the assoĐiatioŶs of 
disability with charity, but the intersectional workings of this perception of charity with 
gender, sexuality, class and race. Although the way we present ourselves can be a conscious 
act of resistance, this resistance is functioning within larger systemic constraints which 
deem our bodies a locus of social control (Ndopu, 2013). 
Resistance: Crip-Queering Adulthood 
With the above complexities in mind, we nevertheless want to end with a more positive, 
and perhaps more subversive, account of our trip downtown. For both Butler (1999) and 
McRuer (2006a) considering gender and/or dis/ability as performative also reveals space to 
subvert these normative gender roles; and they both make the importance of this clear as 
simply recognising discourses of gender and dis/ability as socially and culturally constituted 
will not necessarily lead to their undoing  (Butler, 1993; McRuer, 2006a). They therefore ask 
us to ͞ǁoƌk to the ǁeakŶess iŶ the Ŷoƌŵ͟ ;MĐ‘ueƌ, ϮϬϬϲď, p.30). For Butler (1993) this 
ŵeaŶs ďeiŶg ͚ĐƌitiĐallǇ Ƌueeƌ͛; aŶd foƌ MĐ‘ueƌ ;ϮϬϬϲďͿ it ŵeaŶs ďeiŶg ͚seǀeƌelǇ disaďled͛: 
using the inevitable failure to meet up to the heterosexual/able-ďodied ͚ideal͛ as a ǁaǇ of 
mobilising.  
In our story of the trip downtown we see resistance emerging differently dependent on 
perceptions of dis/ability.  On the one hand, Jen͛s ͚dƌessiŶg doǁŶ͛ aŶd Embla͛s ͚dƌessiŶg up͛ 
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could be presumed to be acting in opposition to, and perhaps un-doing the work of one-
another. Whilst Jen͛s dƌessiŶg doǁŶ ŵaǇ ĐhalleŶge soŵe eǆpeĐtatioŶs of ǇouŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
bodies, Embla strives to be accepted within this construct. One reading of the story could 
theƌefoƌe ďe that ǁe aƌe theƌefoƌe ĐhalleŶgiŶg eaĐh otheƌ͛s politiĐal pƌojeĐts. Yet, MĐ‘ueƌ 
(2006a, 2006b) argues that like the heterosexual ideal, the performativity of ability has 
been normalised, naturalised, to the extent that it goes unnoticed. The normative 
expectation on Jen as a young non-disabled woman is to perform heterofemininity. A 
performance of this heterofemininity, however, would not emerge as an utterance, but a 
silence. In failing to perform heterofemininity, however, attention is brought to Jen͛s 
eŵďodiŵeŶt iŶ a ǁaǇ a ͚dƌessiŶg up͛ ŵaǇ Ŷot haǀe doŶe. Embla͛s ŶoŶ-normative 
embodiment, on the other hand, becomes a spectacle (Shildrick, 1997). As we have seen, 
for disabled young women, the expectation is not to cross into normative adulthood by 
meeting gendered and sexual norms, but to remain the genderless, desexualised eternal 
Đhild. BǇ failiŶg to peƌfoƌŵ ͚aďilitǇ͛, Embla inevitably fails in a performance of 
heterosexuality. Therefore, it is through a performance of femme that her embodiment acts 
as resistance. To follow, McRuer, however, Embla not only stands as a challenge to the 
discourse of disabled people as genderless and desexualised, but also a queering/cripping of 
gender norms.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that adulthood is a social construct, based upon ableist and 
heteronormative ideals. This has consequences for all young people in attempting to cross 
the border zone of youth. Yet, we have addressed the specific consequences for disabled 
young women. Whereas for many young people, the transition between youth and 
adulthood comes with expectation of (hetero)sexual coupling, work and family prospects, 
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disabled young women are rarely understood within normative constructs of gender, 
sexuality and adulthood, and are therefore denied such expectation. This can be dangerous: 
leading to paternalism and, in some cases, non-consensual bodily intervention. 
We have also argued, however, that the solution is not simply to argue young disabled 
women into normative constructs of adulthood gender and sexuality. There are several 
reasons for this. First, even if some young disabled women are accepted within normative 
constructs, for other young disabled women acceptance within normativity seems unlikely. 
This is particularly the case for those with labels of intellectual impairments or considered 
to haǀe the ŵost ͚seǀeƌe͛ iŵpaiƌŵeŶts. “eĐoŶd, aďleist adulthood eǆpeĐtatioŶ is shƌouded 
in other forms of harmful normativity, which is reinforced, rather than critiqued, through an 
aƌguŵeŶt of ͚saŵeŶess͛. IŶ this papeƌ ǁe haǀe ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated oŶ heteƌoseǆual eǆpeĐtatioŶ, 
which cannot be separated from binary constructs of gender. Arguing disabled young 
women into heteronormative expectation further marginalises - and even renders 
unintelligible - queer disabled people.  
Finally, reinforcing normativity restricts the ways that young disabled people are able to 
resist the ableism and heteronormativity of adulthood. As we saw in the story of heading 
downtown, playing with gender, or simply resting from the undeniable activism of being 
disabled and femme, did not feel like an option for Embla and Freyja. The paper has also 
demonstrated, therefore, the complexities and nuances of active resistance to adulthood 
normativity. We call, therefore, for careful readings and interrogations of adulthood which 
pay attention to how the intersections of gender, sexuality, disability, race, class, and global 
positioning, mediate how adulthood - and indeed a resistance to adulthood - can play out. 
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